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Twenty-Five Years of Health Law Through the
Lens of the Civil False Claims Act
Joan H. Krause*
Among the most striking health law developments
in the last quarter-century has been the increasing
focus on healthcare fraud and abuse. In 1985, the
healthcare fraud landscape looked quite different than
it does today; the Stark I self-referral prohibitions, for
example, were not enacted until 1989. Times have
changed, perhaps illustrated nowhere as clearly as in
the expanding role of the Civil False Claims Act
(FCA). 1 Thanks to major amendments in 1986, the
FCA now lies at the heart of the federal government's
war on healthcare fraud. From its origins as a tool to ward off "rampant
fraud" on the Union Army during the Civil War, to its most recent
incarnation in 2009 as the basis for $2.4 billion dollars worth of settlements
and judgments (two-thirds of that attributable to the federal healthcare
programs), the evolution of this once-obscure military fraud statute into the
centerpiece of the anti-fraud agenda has been nothing short of astounding.
Given the prominence of recent healthcare fraud investigations, it is easy
to forget that the FCA was not enacted with healthcare in mind. The
drafters of the 1863 "Informer's Act" had far more mundane war-time
concerns: suppliers who sold blind and deaf mules to the military,
substituted sand for gunpowder, and packed crates with sawdust in lieu of
muskets. From the beginning, the statute included a virtually unique-and
uniquely problematic-qui tam provision that permitted private relators to
bring suit on the government's behalf and to share in the proceeds.
Historically, controversy over the qui tam provisions has been the driving
force behind major amendments to the statute. In 1943, Congress
substantially limited the reach of the qui tam provisions after the Supreme
Court permitted relators to sue based on information already in the
government's possession-in that case, information copied directly from an
indictment accusing the defendants of collusive bidding on government
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contracts. 2 The 1943 amendments established the so-called jurisdictional
bar, prohibiting "parasitic" suits based on previously disclosed information
and drastically reducing the utility of the private cause of action.
With the growth of the administrative state, however, new challenges
arose. The proliferation of federal programs after World War II, including
the eventual creation of Medicare and Medicaid in 1965, provided new
opportunities for abuse and raised awareness about the problem of federal
program fraud. By the 1980's, the Department of Justice estimated that up
to 10% of the federal budget was being lost to fraud and by mid-decade,
nearly half of the country's major defense contractors were under
investigation.3 The FCA seemed a natural solution to these concerns, but its
usefulness was hampered by a number of factors: the statutory penalties
were low (a mere $2,000 per false claim), the circuit courts disagreed on
basic issues such as the required mental state and whether a falsity had to be
material to the government's payment decision in order to violate the law,
and the jurisdictional bar kept many qui tam cases out of court. These
limitations became clear in a 1986 Seventh Circuit decision barring
Wisconsin from bringing a qui tam suit based on a psychiatrist's submission
of fraudulent Medicaid bills because the federal government already was in
possession of that information-thanks to the State itself, which had
dutifully notified the federal government of the psychiatrist's state court
Medicaid fraud conviction.4
Concluding that "only a coordinated effort of both the Government and
the citizenry will decrease this wave of defrauding public funds," Congress
increased the statutory penalties to $5,000 to $10,000 per claim plus treble
damages (subsequently expanded to $5,500 to $11,000 by regulation),
increased the relator's award to 15% to 25% of the proceeds (25% to 30% if
the government declines to intervene in the suit), prohibited employers from
retaliating against whistleblowers who filed qui tam suits, and created an
exception to the jurisdictional bar for a relator who qualified as an "original
source" of the government's information. After 1986, the most common
FCA cause of action imposed liability where a defendant presented or
caused to be presented a claim for payment or approval, the claim was false
or fraudulent, and the defendant's acts were undertaken knowingly (defined
to include not only actual knowledge but also deliberate ignorance or
reckless disregard of truth or falsity). While the amendments did not
2. See United States ex rel. Marcus v. Hess, 317 U.S. 537 (1943); Act of Dec. 23, 1943,
ch. 377, § 3491(C), 57 Stat. 608-09.
3. S. REP. No. 99-345 at 2-3, (1986), reprintedin 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5266-68 (citations
omitted).
4. See United States ex rel. Wisconsin v. Dean, 729 F.2d 1100 (7th Cir. 1984).
5. S. REP. No. 99-345 at 2, (1986) reprintedin 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5267; False Claims
Amendments Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-562, 100 Stat. 3153.
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explicitly target healthcare, it is clear that both the much-scrutinized
defense industry and the fast-growing federal healthcare programs were on
legislators' minds.
If the 1986 amendments did not change the substance of the federal
healthcare laws, however, they did forever change the procedural context in
which healthcare fraud and abuse cases would arise. Although often
overshadowed by the qui tam revisions, the 1986 legislation gave federal
prosecutors substantially more power over those engaged in business with
the federal government, including the healthcare providers who treat
Medicare and Medicaid patients. Increased statutory penalties, coupled
with a scienter requirement that could be satisfied by mere recklessness,
raised the specter of litigation over almost any billing-related
misrepresentation other than a true mistake. The structure of the penalties
and damages provisions proved to be particularly (although perhaps
inadvertently) powerful against physicians, who usually bill on a fee-forservice basis. Unlike in the defense industry, where a contractor may
submit a small number of very large payment requests to the government
each year, physicians submit thousands of bills for relatively small
amounts. In the defense context, treble damages are likely to be the major
deterrent, with the additional $11,000 per-claim penalty merely a nuisance.
For a physician, in contrast, the per-claim penalties may rise quickly even
as treble damages remain small. In the infamous case of United States v.
Krizek, for example, a psychiatrist was accused of submitting 8,000
improper claims, each inflated by about $30, for a total of $245,000 in
damages; invoking the $10,000 per-claim penalty, the government sued him
for nearly $81 million dollars.6 Faced with potential exposure in the tens or
hundreds of millions of dollars, it is no wonder that most defendants choose
to settle FCA allegations rather than testing their luck at trial.
When the qui tam provisions are added to the mix, it is easy to see how
the FCA has transformed the healthcare fraud landscape. FCA suits can be
filed not only by federal prosecutors but also by competitors, current or
former employees, attorneys, and even patients and their families-vastly
increasing exposure. Relators and their attorneys have been instrumental in
pushing the boundaries of the statute, for example, by filing suit not only in
cases where medical care was not provided as claimed, but also where care
was delivered in violation of other federal healthcare program laws that do
not themselves permit a private right of action (such as the Anti-Kickback
Statute and Stark Law). The result likely has exceeded what even the
drafters of the 1986 amendments envisioned: while the federal healthcare
programs accounted for only 12% of qui tam suits in 1987, by 1998 that
number exceeded 61%, far displacing the defense industry as the primary
6.

859 F. Supp. 5 (D.C. Cir. 1994).
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target. In 2008, 228 new healthcare qui tam cases were filed, resulting in
recoveries of almost $9.7 million. Despite the fact that most qui tam suits
do not succeed, those that do have had enormous impact on the industry:
many of the largest healthcare fraud settlements, particularly involving
pharmaceuticals, began as qui tam suits.
Not surprisingly, the very aspects of the 1986 amendments that have led
to increased healthcare fraud recoveries have also generated heavy
criticism. In recent years, for example, qui tam cases have been filed
against an increasingly broad array of health-related entities that do not
directly bill the government for services-including billing consultants,
accountants, and pharmaceutical manufacturers-on the theory that such
entities have "caused" false claims to be submitted as a result of their
improper advice. Moreover, the focus has gradually shifted away from
traditional false claims to those that instead arefraudulent in some manner,
such as where violations of underlying program requirements may render
an otherwise accurate claim ineligible for payment.
Critics of these developments often place the blame squarely on qui tam
relators, who are free to pursue virtually any theory of FCA liability-in
large part because, by definition, they exist outside the governmental
enforcement apparatus. While relators do in many cases provide crucial
information about fraud, there is considerable suspicion that many are
tempted more by the prospect of financial reward than by righteous
indignation (as if the two must be mutually exclusive). Recent qui tam
litigation has focused heavily on the complicated legal provisions governing
who can serve as a relator, including considerations of what it means for a
suit to be based on publicly disclosed information, whether a relator
qualifies as an original source of the information, and whether a relator
must allege fraud with enough specificity to satisfy Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 9(b). Because the checks on qui tam suits are largely procedural
rather than substantive, to many critics the system appears ripe for abuse by
self-interested relators with few, if any, real whistles to blow.
While those who fear relator self-interest may prefer to have the
Department of Justice control the filing of FCA suits as part of a centralized
anti-fraud agenda, however, direct FCA enforcement has also generated
The post-1986 penalty structure permits the
substantial criticism.
government to demand extraordinarily large sums of money, as in Krizek,
leading to accusations of heavy-handed attempts to force settlements.
Hospitals, in particular, have characterized recent enforcement initiatives as
"border[ing] on extortion;" even the courts have on occasion acknowledged
that FCA enforcement has been "rather draconian." 7 As a result, there has
7. Gov'T ACCOUNTING OFFICE, [untitled report], B-279893, at 15 n.30 (July 22, 1998);
Ass'n of Med. Coll. v. United States, 217 F.3d 770, 781 (9th Cir. 2000).
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been a continuous stream of efforts to further amend the law, with defenseoriented attempts to reduce the uncertainty and severity of FCA exposure
countered by competing proposals from those who believe statutory
loopholes allow too many defendants to escape liability purely on
procedural grounds. While the Supreme Court has weighed in on a variety
of FCA procedural issues, such as standing, it has remained largely out of
the fray concerning the application of the statute to common theories of
healthcare fraud.
In the spring of 2009, nearly a quarter-century after the 1986 FCA
amendments, Congress passed the Fraud Enforcement and Recovery Act of
2009 (FERA).8 FERA broadened the scope of the FCA by addressing many
provisions-such as defining a "claim" and specifying how it must be
linked to government funds, requiring materiality, expanding liability for
conspiracies, and broadening the anti-retaliation protections-that critics
had long alleged were permitting unwarranted defenses to liability. The
legislation also gave the government greater power over FCA cases by
permitting the Attorney General to delegate the approval of civil
investigative demands, permitting greater sharing of information with law
enforcement while a case is under seal, and clarifying that the government's
complaint in intervention relates back to the date of the original complaint.
Yet it is interesting to note that FERA did not address many of the most
pressing qui tam procedural concerns, such as the jurisdictional bar or Rule
9(b), perhaps leaving those issues for another day (or at least for the
subsequent healthcare reform legislation).
A quarter-century after the landmark 1986 FCA amendments, then,
where do we stand? The FCA, now even more potent, remains the
centerpiece of the government's anti-fraud agenda. To the extent FERA
clearly benefits prosecutors by expanding the universe of actionable claims,
it does little to address procedural qui tam hurdles, perhaps the legislation
signals Congress' desire for greater governmental control over FCA
litigation.
This goal would seem to comport with the Obama
administration's coordinated approach to healthcare fraud, most notably the
cabinet-level Health Care Fraud Prevention & Enforcement Action Team
(HEAT) initiative announced in May 2009. Yet at the same time, HEAT
has committed the government to using the full range of both civil and
criminal penalties applicable to healthcare fraud-suggesting that the
FCA's role may, in some cases, eventually be supplanted by criminal
prosecution. Whether the dawning of the FERA/HEAT era ultimately
signals an even deeper commitment to the FCA-based anti-fraud agenda, or
one that instead begins to relegate the FCA to merely one among many
powerful anti-fraud tools, only the next twenty-five years will tell.
8.
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